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sales of securities add or drain bank
reserves, creating downward or upward
pressure on the cost and availability of
money and credit, which can be indexed
by the level of the federal funds rate. 
Like open market operations, an increase
or decrease in lending at the discount
window also adds or drains bank
reserves. The level of the discount rate at
which a Reserve Bank will lend is set by
its board of directors, subject to “review
and determination” by the Board of
Governors. With the discount rate below
the federal funds rate, unrestrained 
arbitrage between the discount window
and the funds market would expand the
quantity of bank reserves and pull the
funds rate down to the level of the 
discount rate. The FOMC then might
attempt to push the funds rate back up to
its target level by draining reserves
through open market operations. This
would not work, however, because any
resulting upward pressure on the funds
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New regulations will change the way
credit is rationed at the Federal
Reserve’s discount window. The
Reserve Banks used to charge a
below-market discount rate and rely
on loan officers to restrict access to
loans. Under the new system, the dis-
count rate normally will be signifi-
cantly higher than market rates, but
loans will be available to any sound
institution (which means most) at its
discretion. This new arrangement
eliminates any perception of a sub-
sidy at the discount window. It also
should prevent the actual fed funds
rate from exceeding the discount rate
so long as depository institutions feel
free to borrow at the window.
F or the past 20 years, the Federal
Reserve Banks have made discount win-
dow loans to depository institutions
(DIs) at interest rates that were below
the rate at which DIs would lend to each
other in the federal funds market (see
figure 1). Now, that has changed. On
January 9, 2003, the Reserve Banks
raised their basic discount rates by 
150 basis points to a level higher than
the federal funds rate. This represented
no change in the stance of monetary 
policy, but rather one of operational 
procedure. The intention is to rely on an
above-market discount rate instead of
the administrative devices of 12 Federal
Reserve Banks (such as lending guide-
lines) to ration borrowing at the discount
window. If it works—and so far it has
(see inset on figure 1)—the discount rate
should become a ceiling on the level of
the federal funds rate, the effect of
which will be to keep the actual federal
funds rate closer to the target. Whether
the discount rate actually will act as a
ceiling, however, will only emerge from
experience during periods of substantial
reserve shortage such as those that drove
the funds rate far above the discount rate
in the past. 
This Commentary looks at the changes 
in the behavior of DIs and the 12 Federal
Reserve Banks that will be necessary to
ensure the desired realignment of rates.
In general, three changes must take
place. The first seems assured: Reserve
Banks actually must set their basic dis-
count rates above the Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee (FOMC) target for the
federal funds rate. Initially, rates have
been set at a 100 basis-point spread
above the funds rate target. The Federal
Reserve System has indicated it intends
to maintain a significant positive spread
between these two official rates,
although the size of the spread might
need to be varied. 
Two other important changes must take
place if the actual market federal funds
rate is to remain below the discount rate:
Depository institutions must shed their
reluctance to borrow at the discount 
window, and Reserve Bank lending 
officers must adopt a new approach to
lending. Revisions to Federal Reserve
Regulation A, also effective on January 9,
should facilitate these changes. A com-
parison of the old and new discount 
windows shows how those revisions
enable—but don’t guarantee—the
required changes in borrower and 
lender behavior. 
■ Why the Discount Rate Used
to Be Lower 
Under the old discount window arrange-
ment, the discount rate on adjustment
credit typically was below the funds rate,
sometimes by a very substantial margin.
(Adjustment credit was the most basic of
the three types of credit provided.) This
was possible only because DIs were
reluctant to borrow at the discount 
window and Reserve Banks operated
under Board of Governors regulations
that guarded against arbitraging the low
discount rate. Otherwise, the funds rate
would have fallen to the level of the 
discount rate and generated an inconsis-
tency between the institutional structure
of the Federal Reserve System and the
structure of the market for bank reserves. 
To understand this potential inconsis-
tency, recognize that the Banking Act of
1935 lodges monetary policy authority
in the United States in the Federal Open
Market Committee. The FOMC includes
the seven members of the Board of 
Governors, the president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, and, on a
rotating basis, four presidents of the
remaining 11 Reserve Banks. Policy
authority is exerted mostly through open
market operations. These purchases orrate would simply trigger additional
borrowing that replaced the drained
reserves as DIs took advantage of the
rate spread.
Such a tug-of-war is entirely hypotheti-
cal, of course. For one thing, the gover-
nors represent a majority of the FOMC,
so an imagined conflict over the appro-
priate policy rate only would be possible
if the usual policy consensus failed to
emerge from discussions within the
FOMC. More to the point, 30 or more
years’experience of a federal funds rate
above the discount rate has shown no
tendency for borrowed reserves to
replace nonborrowed reserves because
the Reserve Banks guarded against 
arbitrage. In fact, higher levels of bor-
rowing did not pull the funds rate down
toward the discount rate. Instead, higher
spreads seem to have been necessary to
overcome DIs’reluctance to borrow. 
■ The Old and the New 
To keep the federal funds rate from
being pulled down to the level of the
discount rate when the discount rate was
a below-market rate, Reserve Banks had
to maintain nonprice guidelines that
would ration access to discount window
credit. Lending officers had to engage in
nonprice rationing of adjustment credit
loans to DIs experiencing unexpected
and exceptional reserve shortages. They
screened out borrowers who might bor-
row too frequently, had unused alterna-
tive sources of funds, or would relend
discount window credit in the market. 
Changes in Regulation A are intended to
eliminate nonprice rationing of discount
window credit. Central to the new dis-
count window is the primary credit pro-
gram, which provides the counterpart of
the old discount window’s adjustment
credit. Like adjustment credit, primary
credit is designed as a “back-up source
of liquidity” to supply credit mostly “on
a short-term basis, usually overnight.”
The difference between the new and the
old windows is that eligible DIs—those
in sound condition with adequate collat-
eral—may borrow reserves through the
primary credit program at their own 
discretion. Of course, they can do so
only at the new level of the discount
rate, 100 basis points above the mone-
tary policy target for the federal funds
rate. DIs ineligible for primary credit
must use a secondary credit facility
under close scrutiny, again with ade-
quate collateral, and at an interest rate
50 basis points above the new discount
rate on primary credit. 
The vast majority of DIs are eligible for
primary credit because their supervisors
judge them to be in sound condition. 
As a result, any time the federal funds rate
were to rise above the discount rate, eligi-
ble DIs in need of funds could borrow
from the Reserve Banks rather than in the
funds market. The availability of primary
credit should make the discount rate an
effective ceiling on the funds rate, just as
it does in a number of other nations with
similar discount window arrangements.
Under the old discount window regula-
tions, too-frequent borrowing was dis-
couraged, but the revised rules should
make this unnecessary. At a discount rate
100 basis points above the target federal
funds rate, it seems unlikely that frequent
borrowing could be profitable. Arguably,
some eligible DIs might have such 
attractive lending opportunities and scarce
funding sources that the discount window
would represent a profitable source of
funds. If this turns out to be the case, an
important question then would be
whether supervisors consider this a safe
and sound practice for otherwise sound
DIs. If not, then Reserve Bank directors
and the Board of Governors could
increase the spread of the discount rate
above the funds rate target to further 
discourage frequent borrowing without
reimposing administrative guidelines for
rationing credit. 
Another old adjustment credit rationing
device required DIs to exhaust market
alternatives before turning to the dis-
count window. Those eligible for the
new primary credit program need not
demonstrate that they have exhausted
alternatives (except those seeking loans
with a maturity longer than “a very short
term….usually overnight” but only “up
to a few weeks”). Again, a well-managed
DI normally wouldn’t want to pay the
premium discount rate for primary credit
when it had cheaper alternatives, making
an administrative rule superfluous. A
possible objection might be that some
DIs, not in good condition, could borrow
at the discount window and avoid paying
an even greater risk premium for funds
in the market. The new program should
avoid such “adverse selection” because
DIs judged to be in poor condition are
not eligible for primary credit. Instead,
they must use the secondary credit pro-
gram that continues to rely on nonprice
rationing (close scrutiny of reasons for
borrowing, means of repayment, and
changes in condition) in addition to
price rationing (a rate 50 basis points
higher than the primary credit rate).
A prohibition on relending was a third
standard discount window policy for non-
price rationing of adjustment credit. Now,
for primary credit borrowers, a policy
against relending funds would be coun-
terproductive to a goal of the program,
which is to constrain variations in the 
federal funds rate. When there is a short-
age of reserves at many DIs, those that
borrow and relend are performing a ser-
vice in the market that otherwise would
have to be done by the Reserve Banks.
Revised Regulation A recognizes this by
removing the guideline against relending.
In this way, market forces can take over at
least part of the job that had fallen to the
Reserve Banks when they had to protect
against funds market arbitrage.
Two other types of types of credit were
available under the old discount win-
dow:  seasonal borrowing and extended
credit. These programs provided longer-
term loans to a small number of borrow-
ers in special circumstances. The recent
revisions to Regulation A make no
change in seasonal lending. This pro-
gram provides credit (at an interest rate
tied to market rates) to DIs, typically
small institutions in agricultural or vaca-
tion areas, that experience pronounced
and protracted seasonal swings in loan
demand relative to deposit supply and
that lack reasonable access to market
sources to close the funding gap. 
Extended credit has been available,
within constraints set by Congress, for
funding a troubled DI until supervisors
resolved its difficulties. Revised Regula-
tion A folds extended credit into the new
secondary credit program. Secondary
credit presents no danger of arbitrage
with the federal funds market. 
The transition from nonprice rationing
to price rationing of discount window
credit must involve more than a change
in the wording of Regulation A if the
desired results are to be achieved. Habits
of thought and action must change.
Potential borrowers no longer should
wonder how they can demonstrate that
they will not borrow too frequently, that
they have exhausted all other possible
sources of funds, and that they will not 
be relending the borrowed funds. Like-
wise, lending officers should no longer
ask for nor expect to be offered suchdemonstrations from potential borrow-
ers. The necessary conditions for receiv-
ing a loan are that the borrower be a
sound DI, that it have adequate collateral,
and that it pay the going discount rate.
■ Roots of Reluctance
Neither reluctance to borrow nor
restrictive lending guidelines were a
part of the initial design or operation of
the discount window contained in the
1913 Federal Reserve Act. Instead, the
discount window was at the center of
monetary policy operations under the
gold standard. The Reserve Banks were
expected to accommodate DIs when
they sought funds to finance the short-
term credit needs of commercial cus-
tomers. They did so by discounting
(buying) DIs’existing short-term com-
mercial credits (called “real bills,”
extended to bank customers to finance
their shipments of output) at a discount
rate that was competitive with market
rates. If inflation or deflation brought
with it an inflow or outflow of gold, the
Reserve Banks could raise or lower
their discount rates relative to market
rates in other gold standard countries
and correct the imbalance. 
But this original policy conception never
was fully implemented. The onset of
World War I soon flooded the market
with Treasury securities. Banks in need
of extra reserves began to use their 
Treasuries as collateral for discount
window loans rather than discounting
bills. By the 1920s, changes in mone-
tary policy procedures brought open
market operations in Treasury securities
to the center of policy operations. More
important, an interbank federal funds
market developed at a positive rate
spread above the discount rate. This
appears to have reflected a growing
view that depository institutions nor-
mally should fund themselves from
market sources, using the discount 
window to obtain reserves only in
exceptional circumstances of reserve
shortage. The onset of the Great Depres-
sion cut short this experience with a
positive rate spread and reserves short-
age, but by the 1960s, the funds market
again had become a dependable venue
for DIs to buy and sell reserves for
same-day reserve position adjustment. 
DIs’reluctance to borrow undoubtedly
took root in Reserve Banks’lending
guidelines. This can be inferred from
the fact that only rarely did Reserve
Banks actually deny requests for adjust-
ment credit. Rather, most DIs avoided
applying for credit even when the funds
rate was far above the discount rate.
Transformation of loan officers’guide-
lines into reluctance to borrow is readily
explained. DIs knew that they could not
expect to borrow at will from the
Reserve Banks because credit was
rationed, albeit without explicit quanti-
fied guidelines. Therefore, each DI was
reluctant to borrow lest it use up an
implicit limit on the number of times it
might expect to borrow at the discount
window. Too-frequent borrowing might
preclude receiving a loan when faced
with an even more severe reserve short-
age or might incur adverse supervisory
comment. 
Widespread belief in an implicit limit
on the use of adjustment credit was
reflected in common explanations for
the funds rate normally trading above
the discount rate. For example, it was
argued that a DI’s reserve position
manager would want to avoid present-
ing senior management and directors
with information that could be inter-
preted as evidence of bad judgment. 
A visible trip to the discount window
would be evidence of bad judgment,
whereas managing to cover an unex-
pected need for funds in the market
would not. Paying a very high price in
the funds market also might not reflect
bad judgment. After all, the extra cost
would be only slightly more than
$2,700 per extra percentage point per
hundred million dollars per night.
A more basic example was the wide-
spread perception of a stigma associated
with using adjustment credit. The
Reserve Banks do not make the names
of the DIs to whom they lend public.
Nonetheless, total adjustment credit 
borrowing typically was small enough 
at most Reserve Banks that market
observers might make inferences from
an increase in a Reserve Bank’s lending
and a particular DI’s prior market search
for funds or rumors of its funding prob-
lems. If a DI’s trip to the “lender of last
resort” was inferred, it might be viewed
as an act of desperation by an institution
whose difficulties were not just an 
end-of-day surprise, but something
much deeper. Any consequent widen-
ing of the DI’s risk spread in funding
markets might cost far more than the
immediate saving realized from going
to the window. 
■ Overcoming Reluctance to
Borrow and Lend
One success of the new primary credit
program will be the elimination of a
“subsidy” discount rate. A second will
come when unintended shortages in the
supply of reserves and unforeseen bulges
in the demand for reserves no longer
drive the federal funds rate above the 
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discount rate. Under the old discount
window, DIs’reluctance to borrow,
reflecting Reserve Banks’credit
rationing, maintained the funds rate
above the discount rate. Changes to
Regulation A have substituted price 
(an above-market discount rate) for 
nonprice (administrative guidelines)
methods of rationing discount window
credit. As long as DIs understand that
they need not be reluctant to ask for a
loan, but only reluctant to pay the 
discount rate price, then primary credit
borrowing should keep the federal funds
rate at or below the discount rate. For
this to happen, the Reserve Banks must
make eligible DIs feel free to borrow at
their own discretion.